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Novel Properties
Add or modify boot paths
Transparent to node user
VM-like isolation for physical nodes
Fully automated
No local state dependency
 
Secure, Flexible Boot Path
BIOS and boot loader are
measured by TPM - control is
passed to the boot loader
Current stage receives next 
stage and measures it in 
software
Current stage creates TLS 
session with the boot server 
and asks whether or not to 
continue
Imaging Environment






















Repeat steps 2 through 3 until the last 
stage is reached
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Physical nodes are time-shared
Users have root access
Even BIOS is untrusted
Nodes must be scrubbed completely 
between uses
500+ physical nodes in constant use
Automated node allocation/deallocation
Admin interaction is not feasible
Node boot paths change frequently
Boot code is upgraded periodically
Locking down to one particular boot 
path per node is not acceptable
Redesign the boot path to protect the 
disk-loading process while adhering to 
the above requirements
The Emulab testbed gives users full access to physical nodes
Critical Design Points
Hybrid HW/SW technique for 
"measuring" (verifying) boot stages
Immutable hardware trust root (TPM)
Server verifies dynamic boot stages
If any stage fails to verify, boot process 
is aborted




BIOS POSTs and boots
PXE code
PXE consults boot server and 
receives imaging environment
Imaging Environment
writes new image to disk
Node reboots and 
boots from disk
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